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MONETARYPOLICYWITH A CREDIT AGGREGATE TARGET
Abstract
Theprincipal criteria for the selection of an intermediate target
for monetary policy are (1) that the target be closely related to the
nonfinancial objectives of monetary policy, (2) that itcontaininformation
aboutthe future movements of those relevant aspects of the nonfinancial
economy, (3) that it be closely connected to the instruments over which
the central bank can exert direct control, and(4)that data on it be
readily available on a timely basis.
Theevidencepresented in this paper indicates that, on each of
the four criteria considered, total net credit is just as suitable as
anyofthe monetary aggregates to serve as an intermediate target for
monetarypolicy in the United States. As long as the Federal Reserve
System continues to use an intermediate target procedure, this evidence
is consistent with adopting a two—target framework based on both money and
credit, thereby drawing on information from both sides of the public's
balance sheet for the set of signals that govern the systematic response







MONETARY POLICY WITH A CREDIT AGGREGATE TARGET
BenjaminM. Friedman*
Harvard University
Monetary policy procedures typically have short life spans.
Some basic elements endure, of course, but experience suggests
that central banks frequently overhaul the specific operating
procedures they use to implement monetary policy. These adaptations,
whichoccur at irregular intervals, canbe responses to changes
inthe underlying economic andfinancialenvironment, toshifts in
policyobjectives, or even to advances in economic science.
In the United States the past decade or so has been an
especially fast—moving period from, this perspective. The emergence
of rapid and volatile price inflation in the late 1960s had made
nominal interest rates, which the Federal Reserve System had
emphasized since world War II, clearly less reliable as a focus
for monetary policy) At the beginning of the l970s, therefore,
theFederal Reserve shifted to a policy framework based on monetary
aggregates as intermediate targets.2 During most of the l970s
interest rates remained an important part of the policy process,
butprimarily as the instrument used to influence the growth of the
targeted monetary aggregates. In a widely pub1iized action in
October 1979, however, the Federal Reserve abandoned interest
rates altogether and adopted new procedures based on controlling
the monetary aggregates via the quantity of bank reserves. In the
meanwhile, a series of innovations in financial institutions and—2—
practices during the 1970s had progressively blurred the meaning
of "money." Early in 1980, therefore, the Federal Reserve implicitly
changed its operating procedures once again, this time by redefining
the monetary aggregates used as the intermediate targets.
As is nearly always the case when central banks change
operating procedures, these most recent changes —to a reserves
instrument instead of an interest rate instrument, and to new
monetary aggregate intermediate targets —haveraised new questions
and revived old ones. Indeed, as a measure of its own active
concern with these questions, the Federal Reserve Board in 1981
published a two—volume study, New Monetary Control Procedures,
consisting of thirteen staff papers on various aspects of the subject.
Although these studies addressed a broad range of specific topics,
the main focus was on the same issues that have always been central
to the analysis of monetary policy procedures under an intermediate
target strategy: what aggregates to target, what instruments to
use to achieve those targets, and what variation of both instruments
and intermediate targets to seek (or tolerate) over time. Apparently
these basic issues are as open today as they have been at any time
in the past.
The object of this paper is to consider the evidence bearing
on the most central of these choices determining monetary policy
procedures under the intermediate target approach —the selection
of the intermediate target itself —andto do so in the context of
a specific alternative to the current exclusive reliance on the
monetary aggregates. In particular, in a series of recent papers—3—
(Friedman 1981, 1982a, 1982b) I have documented the stability of
the relationship between credit and income in the United States,
and have gone on to suggest several implications of this regularity
for both monetary arid fiscal policies. The chief implication for
monetary policy is that the available empirical evidence On the
relative stability of the credit-to-income and money-to-income
relationships does not support a special role for money over credit
in formulating and implementing monetary policy. Since there is
nothing special about (inside) money from an a priori perspective
either, there is therefore little basis for monetary policy procedures
which focus on target growth rates for specific measures of the
money stock with little if any attention paid to credit measures.
Although a close and reliable relationship to nonfinancial
economic activity is perhaps the most important factor determining
the suitability of a financial aggregate as an intermediate monetary
policy target, it is hardly the only consideration. A second
importantcriterion is that the relationship of an intermediate
target tononfinancial activity must go beyond mere contemporaneous
correlation, so that current movements of the target contain
informationabout future movements of the relevant aspects of the
nonfinancial economy. Athirdcriterion is that an intermediate
targetmust also be closely related to the instruments under the
central bank's direct control —inthe United States under current
procedures the stock of nonborrowed reserves, or alternatively a
short—term interest rate. Finally, a fourth criterion is that data
on an intermediate target must be readily available on a timely basis.—4—
Although special strength in some areas may compensate for weakness
in others, gross failure on any one of these grounds would render
any variable unsuitable as an intermediate target for monetary
policy.
This paper presents evidence for the United States comparing
total net credit, the credit aggregate that displays the most
stable relationship with income, to the major monetary aggregates
on each of these four criteria. Section I reviews and updates
the evidence showing that the stability of the credit-to-income
relationship is comparable to that of the money—to—income relation-
ship. section II presents evidence on the degree to which current
movements of either credit or money signal future movements of
nonfinancial economic activity. Section III turns to the question
of whetherthe Federal Reservecould actuallymeet predetermined
creditgrowth targets, and presents evidence on the relationship
of total net credit and the monetary aggregates, respectively,
to nonborrowed reserves and to the federal funds rate. Section IV
focuses on the timing and reliability of the available credit
data by presenting some preliminary results based on monthly
credit series. Section V briefly summarizes the main conclusions
reached in the paper and highlights their implications for monetary
policy.
The evidence presented in this paper indicates that, on
each of the four criteria considered, total net credit is just
as suitable as any. of the monetary aggregatesto serve asan
intermediatetargetfor monetary policy. As long as the Federal—5—
Reserve continuesto useanintermediate target procedure, this
evidence is consistent with adopting a two—target framework based
on both money and credit, thereby drawing on information from
both sides of the publics balance sheet for the set of signals
that govern the systematic response of monetary policy to economic
events.—6—
I.The Stability of the Credit-to-Income Relationship3
The intermediate target procedure for monetary policy
involves specifying some financial variable Cs) —inthe United
States today, the monetary aggregates —tostand as proxy for
the real economic targets at which monetary policy ultimately
aims, such as economic growth, price stability, employment, and
international balance. The result is, in effect, a two—step
procedure.The central bank first determines what growth of the
intermediate target is most likely to correspond to the desired
ultimate economic outcome.Itthen sets some operating instrument
over which it can exertclose control —inthe United States
eithera short—term interest rate or, since October 1979, the
quantity of bank reserves —soas to achieve that growth rate for
the intermediate target itself.
The first, and most obvious, criterion for selecting a
suitable intermediate target is that the targeted measure must be
closely and reliably related to the nonfinancial objectives of
monetary policy. Despite the proven seductiveness of discussions
about whether any given monetary aggregate will or will not be
within the announced target range on some chosen date, it is
importantnever to lose sight of the simple truth that anysuch
aggregatehas no policy significance in and of itself. What
matters is the effect of monetary policy on the nonfinancial
economy,and intermediate targets not reliably related to that
effecthave no role at all to play in the monetary policy process.
Results based on a variety of methodological approaches
consistently indicate that total net credit in the United States ——7--
that is, the aggregate outstanding indebtedness of all U.S.
nonfinancial borrowers —bearsas close and as stable a relationship
to U.s. nonfinancial economic activity as do the more familiar
asset aggregates like the money stock (however defined) or the
monetary base. Moreover, in contrast to the familiar asset
aggregates, among which there seems to be less basis for choice
from this perspective, total net credit appears to be unique in
this regard among major liability aggregates. Unlike the asset
aggregates, the stability of the relationship for total net credit
does not just represent the stability of a sum of stable parts.
The U.S. nonfinancial economy's reliance on credit, scaled
in relation to economic activity, has shown almost no trend and
but little variation since World War II. After falling from 156%
of gross national product in 1946 to 127% in 1951, and then rising
to 144% in 1960, total net credit has remained within a few
percentage points of that level ever since. (The yearend 1981
level was 143%.) Otherwise it has exhibited a slight cyclicality,
typically rising a percentage point or two in recession years
(when gross national product, in the denominator, is weak) and
then falling back. Although the individual components of this
total have varied in sharply different directions both secularly
and cyclically, on the whole they have just offset one another.
In brief, the secular rise in private debt has largely mirrored
a substantial decline (relative to economic activity) in federal
government debt, while bulges in federal debt issuance during
recessions have mostly had their counterpart in the abatement—8—
ofprivate borrowing.
The first four columns of Table 1 summarize the stability
of the ratios to gross national product of six financial aggregates
—totalnet credit andfiveothers —byshowing the coefficient
of variation (standard deviation normalized by mean) for each
ratio computed from both annual and quarterly U.S. data over the
4
1959—80 sample period.In each case the table shows the coefficient
of variation computed from raw data, and also computed from detrended
data. Total net credit consistently displays the smallest coefficient
of variation among the six aggregates, and by a substantial margin,
regardless of whether the data are annual or quarterly, or raw or
detrended.
What matters for monetary policy, of course, is not just
the absence of a time trend, and not even stability at each
individual moment of time, but stability in a dynamic sense.
Simple ratios of precisely contemporaneous observations may
therefore fail to capture what is important in the relationship
among variables that move over time with some general lead or
lag pattern between them. The remaining columns of Table 1 present
therespective standard errors, coefficients of determination and
Durbin—Watson statistics of six estimated regression equations, in
each case relating the growth of nominal gross national product to
a moving average of the growth of one of the sixfinancialaggregates
listedin the table, plus a moving average of a fiscal policy
measure. The equations are estimated, using quarterly data for



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































=a÷ it-i + (1)
where Y is gross national product, F is anyofthe six financial
aggregates, and E is federal government expenditures calculated
on a high employment basis, all expressed in natural logarithms,
and a, the 13. and the y. are scalar coefficients, with the
and y. constrained to lie along respective fourth—order polynomials
withthe implied l =
135
= == O.Here total net credit
exhibitsa closer relationship to nominal income than does any
oftheother aggregates except the narrow money stock.6
In partbecauseof the extent to which regressions of the
form (1) have been discredited by a variety of criticisms, researchers
examining the money—to—income (or, here, credit—to—income) relation-
ship have increasingly turned to methods that allow for a richer
dynamic interaction by relating the variation of income not to
the entirety of the variation of money but only to that part of
it which cannot already be deduced either from the past history
of money itself or from the joint past history of both money and
income.7 In this context a key indication of the stability of the
relationshipto income of anyfinancialaggregate is the behavior
of that relationship following just such an "innovation," or
unanticipatedmovement, in the aggregate (or in income). A more
general representation of (1) that is consistent with this interpreta-
tion (but that omits the fiscal variable, so as to keep the order
of the system small) is the vector autoregression—10—
a1B11 B12 Y_1 = + + (2)
Ft a2 B21 B22Ftil2
where Y and F are again as in (1), the p. are disturbances, the
a. are fixed sàalar coefficierits to be estimated, and the B.
:i. 1J
arefixed—coefficientlag operator polynomials to be estimated.
Solutionof the autoregression (2), once it is estimated,
yields a moving—average representation of the form
0]] 012 lt = ÷ (3)
Ft 2 021022 2t
where the .and0.. are respectively fixed scalar coefficients and
fixed—coefficient lag operator polynomials derived from recursive
substitution of the and from (2) to express both Y and F
as functions of the current values and past histories of both
and p2, and the normalization convention imposed in estimating
(2) constrains the zero—lag elements of the four polynomials
in (3) to 011 =22
=1and 012 =2l
=0(so that p1 is "the
Y disturbance" and tithe F disturbance"). The orthogonalization
of (3) that extracts the independent part ofi2 (say, €2) as "the
F innovation tbisthen just
ll 12 1t = + (4)
Ftl 2l 22 2t—11—
where the '..andthe 6.followfrom the e.. and the ii.,respectively,
and the 6.areindependent.8
The upper panel of Table 2 summarizes simulations of (4),
estimated in the form (1) using 1959—80 quarterly data for nominal
gross national product and each of the six financial aggregates
from Table 1, with eight quarters of lags on each variable in each
equation. For convenience the table reports the response of F/Y
rather than the individual responses of F and Y separately. Each
column in the table presents values, for the initial quarter and
then for the final quarter in each of the first five years,
indicating the time path followed by F/y (for the definition of
F indicated) in response to a 1% innovation in F.9
Although it is impossible to interpret these simulation
results in other than a descriptive way, th.e responses suggest
quite different degrees of dynamic stability among the six aggregate-
to—income relationships. By construction, Y remains unaffected
contemporaneously, so that in the initial quarter each F/y ratio
rises by 1%. Thereafter the bulge disappears from most of the
ratios as Y rises or F declines, or both. The time pattern by
which it disappears varies from one aggregate to another, however.
TheMl money stock ratio quickly returns to (and remains approximately
at) the initial base line, andtheM2 and total net credit ratios
doalso, albeit with some delay. By contrast, the bank credit
and M3 ratios show little tendency to decline until after two years.
The monetary base ratio over—corrects and then remains persistently
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to nominal income in this sense, with M2 and total net credit
close behind.0
A further aspect of the tendency in recent research to
avoid simple nominal income regressions of the form (1) has been
a reluctance to ignore the distinction between the real and price
components of nominal income variation. The lower panel of Table 2
summarizes simulations that are analogous to those shown in the
upper half of the table but basedonthe moving—average respresenta—






Ft a3 B31 B32 B33Ft_1 113
whereXisreal gross national product andPis. the price deflator
(both in natural logarithms). Here the total net credit andMl
ratios are the two that quickly return to, and remain nearly at,
the initial base line. Once again, the stability of the total net
credit ratio is comparable to that of anyofthe monetary aggregates.11
Finally, it is useful to point out that the stability of
the credit—to—income relationship is a phenomenon in no way
restricted to the United States in the post World War II period.
The U.S. nonfinancial economy's reliance on credit relative to
economic activity has shown essentially no trend not just over the
past thirty years but over the past sixty. (The 1921 level was
142%.) Nonfinancial borrowers' outstanding debt rose
significantly in relation to gross national product only during—13—
the depression years 1930—33, when the economy was deteriorating
rapidly andmanyrecorded debts had defaulted de facto anyway.
Otherwise the postwar stability in the United States appears to
be a continuation of a pattern that dates back at least six decades.
Among foreign economies, empirical research thus far has demonstrated
a similar comparability of the credit-to-income aridmoney-to-
income relationships in Britain, Canada, Germanyand Japan.
Insum, there is ample ground for believing that total net
credit, measured by the total outstanding indebtedness of all of
the economy's nonfinancial borrowers, is as closely related to
nonfinancialeconomic activity as are the monetary aggregates
which are so central to today's monetary policy framework.-14-
II. The Information Content of Money and Credit
Theessence of the intermediate target procedure is that,
under it, the central bank is required to respond quickly (and fully)
to any information reflected in the movements of whatever the
intermediate target happens to be. Under the current framework
in the United States, with monetary aggregates used as the interme-
diatetargets, any movementin the public's money holdings therefore
createsa presumption that the Federal Reserve System should
react. In principle the Federal Reserve is always free to change
the money growth targets, of course, but in practice it is typically
reluctant to do so. The intermediate target strategy instead
callsfor actionsaimed at regaining the stated targets, so that
the economic signals contained in thovements of the monetary
aggregates create a presumption of immediate response. By contrast,
the presumption of this strategy, strictly implemented, is that
there will be no response to signals arising from other sources
but not reflected in the intermediate targets.
This procedure makes sense only if the relationship of the
intermediate target to the nonfinancial objectives of monetary
policy is more than just that of a mirror providing a reflection.
Targeting a financial aggregate that merely moved in step with
nonfinancial activity, without signaling subsequent non financial
outcomes,would provide no advantages over directly targeting
some aspect of nonfinancial activity itself.12 Instead, current
movements of the intermediate target must contain information
aboutthe future movements of nonfinancial monetary policy objectives.
Hencethe finding that the credit-to—income relationship is as—15—
regular andasstable as the money—to—income relationship would
be of little interest in a policy context if the economic behavior
underlying these results were such that money "causes" income
while income in turn "causes" credit, in the sense of causality
that, as Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) have shown, corresponds
to econometric exogeneity.
Table 3 summarizes the evidence on the interrelationships
among money, credit, income and prices, based again on quarterly
data for 1959-80. The top panel of the table presents F-statistics
for the test of the null hypothesis that all of the eight coefficients
in each respective polynomial are zero, in each successive equation
inthe trivariateautoregression (5) in which the financial
aggregate variable is defined as the Mlmoney stock. The middle
panel presentsanalogous F—statistics forthe corresponding
trivariateautoregression in which the financial aggregate is total
netcredit.
These results are not consistent with any simple proposition
that money "causes" income while income "causes" credit. If anything,
they suggest the opposite. Past credit innovations contain more
significant information aboutthe variation of either real income
or prices than do past money innovations. Similarly, both real
income innovations and price innovations are highly significant
in the money equation in the top panel, but only the price innova-
tions are (marginally) significant in the credit equation in the
middle panel. Moreover, the corresponding results shown in the
bottom panel of the table, for the four—variable analog to (5)TABLE 3











Notes: X =grossnational product in constant prices





significant at 10% level
EstimationofAutoregressive System(X,P,M)
Equation:X 65.68* 1.68
















1.49 1 .18 60.14 *—16—
including both money and credit as well as real income and prices,
are also inconsistent with any simple money—then—income—then—credit
13
reasoning.
It is also possible to examine in greater generality the
extent to which movements of money and credit contain information
about the subsequent movements of nonfinancial economic activity.
Table 4 presents a dynamic decomposition of the respective variances
of real income and prices, based on the moving—average representation
of the four-variable autoregression (including both money and
credit as well as real income and prices) underlying the bottom
panel of Table 3. Specifically, Table 4 shows, for both real
income and prices, and for time horizons extending from one
quarter to two years, the percentage of variance accounted for by
innovations in each of the four variables in the system (including,
14 of course, the variable under study itself). Because the
results of a variance decomposition (unlike the exogeneity test
results presented in Table 3) clearly depend on the ordering imposed
in orthogonalizing the moving—average system,15 the table presents
corresponding sets of results for four different orderings: for
the two financial aggregates ordered either before or after real
income and prices, and for money ordered either before or after
creditwithin the pair of financial variables.
The variance decomposition results shown in Table 4indicate
thatthe comparisons based on statistical significance in Table 3
generally carry over to comparisons based on quantitative significance.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































one—third or more of the variance of real income after the initial
quarter. If money is ordered before credit, the division between
the two aggregates depends on the time horizon, with money appearing
moreimportant than credit for a year, and vice versa thereafter.
By contrast, ifcreditis ordered before money, itappearsmore
important throughout. When ordered after the nonfinancial variables,
the financial aggregates together account for less of the variance
of real income, in a pattern that slowly builds toward one-fifth
ofthe total. The division between money and credit again depends
on the time horizon if money is ordered before credit, andagain
favors credit throughout if credit is ordered before money.
Onesurprising aspect of these results is that the two
financial variables together consistently accountfor a smaller
fraction of the variance of prices than of real income. When the
financial aggregates are ordered first, that share barely exceeds
one—tenth, even after two years. When the financial aggregates
are ordered after real income and prices, the corresponding share
is almost negligible. Within these smaller amounts, credit usually
(but not always) accounts for more of variance of prices than does
money.
Becausethese results change importantly according to not
just the ordering among the variables but also the sample period
used, it would be unwise to rely heavily on them in any very
specific way.16 A conservative interpretation of the results
presented in Tables 3 and 4 is to conclude that current movements
of financial aggregates do contain information, which is at least—18—
potentially of quantitative importance, about future movements of
nonfinancial economic activity, and that the information about
nonfinancial activity contained in total net credit is at least
comparable to that contained in the narrow money stock. More
generally, yet another mode of analysis that potentially could
indicate a more important role for money than for credit as an
intermediate target variable does not do so.—19—
III. Controlling Money and Credit
The criteria that determine the suitability of any financial
variable as an intermediate target for monetary policy include
a relationship not Only to the nonfinancial objectives of policy
but also to the operating instruments that the central bank can
control directly —inthe U.S. context, once again, either reserves
or a short—term interest rate. For example, although common
stock prices in the United States are a well known leading indicator
of business activity, there is little evidence to suggest that the
Federal Reserve could exert sufficiently close control over the
stock market to make it a good monetary policy target.17 There
would be little point in having an intermediate target that the
central bank could not expect to affect reasonably closely, within
some plausible time horizon (like a calendar quarter or a half—year)
determined by considerations of what matters for the economy as
well as what provides political accountability.18
The broader the scope of any financial aggregate —on
either the asset or the liability side of the economy's balance
sheet —andthe greater the variety of institutions and individuals
involvedin supplying and demanding it,themore problematic at
the a priorilevel is the connection between that aggregate and
the instruments under the central bank's direct control. Even
in the case of the narrow money stock, the number and complexity
of the linkages relating its movements to movements of reserves
(or the monetary base) are fairly burdensome at either the analytical
or the operational level)9 This problem is likely to be more—20—
severefor the broader monetary aggregates; and, at least in
principle, total net credit could turn out to be even harder to
relate to reserves than M2 or M3. In the end, however, the
potential controllability of any such aggregate, either narrow or
broad, depends on a diverse set of substitution responses character-
izing the behavior of manydifferentkinds of individual and
institutional portfolios.
The top panel of Table 5 provides summary statistics for
the estimation, using quarterly data for 1959-80, of the relationship
4 4 4
LFt
=a+.AYt. + ÷ (6) i=l i=l
where F and Y are again as in (2),rD istheFederal Reserve
discountrate, R is the natural logarithm of the quantity of
nonborrowed reserves (adjusted for changes in reserverequirements),
and a,thes..,theand the 5.arescalar coefficients with the
three sets of distributed lag coefficients constrained to lie
along respective third-order polynomials with the implied
=== o.20Theequationfor the credit aggregate (again
totalnetcredit) performs better on an overall basis than does
thatfor any of the three monetary aggregates. The credit equation
has a quarterly standard error of 0.4%, or 1.4% per annum. By
contrast, the Ml and M2 equations both show standard errors of
2.5% per annum, and the M3 equation's standard error is 2.6%
21
per annum.
It is always possible,of course, that a closeoverall
fit in a relationship like (6) may reflect only the closeness ofTABLE 5
FINANCIAL AGGREGATE CONTROL RELI.TIONSHIPS: QUARTERLY DATA
SE DW
Reserves Instrument
Aggregate: Credit .00360 .58 1.17
Ml .00614 .26 1.77
M2 .00619 .34 1.20
M3 .00651 .35 .89
Reserves Instrument with Lagged Dependent Variable
Aggregate: Credit .00280 .74 2,05
Ml .00612 .26 .00
M2 .00538 .50 1.81
M3 .00519 .58 1.95
Interest Rate Instrument
Aggregate: Credit .00356 .59 1.13
Ml .00628 .22 1.59
M2 .00477 ,l 1,17
M3 .00701 .24 .63
Interest Rate Ins trument with Lagged Dependent Variable
Aggregate: Credit .00275 .75 2,09
Ml .00610 .27 2.04
M2 .00407 .72 2.02
M3 .00489 .63 2,03—21—
theaggregate's relation to income,without anyimplicationat
allof a connection to the reserves instrument. The top two panels
of Table 6 show the full sets of estimated coefficients for the
credit and Ml equations summarized in the top panel of Table 5.
Although credit is more closely related to the income terms in the
equation than is Ml, as a comparison of the t-statistics on the
respectivevalues and their sum indicates, it is not the case
that credit lacks any connection to the reserves instrument. A
comparison of the t-statistics on the respective Svaluesshows
that the connection to reserves is somewhat weaker for credit
22 than for Ml, but significant nonetheless.
Except for the case of Ml, the Du.rbin—Watson statistic for
each of the estimates of (6) showninthe top panel of Table5
indicates significant serial correlation in the residuals. The
second panel of the table shows corresponding sulrlxnary statistics
for the expandedrelationship
=a+ + + + (7)
including a distributed lag (estimated analogously to the others) on
the lagged dependent variable. To the extent that recent movements
of an aggregate contain information that the Federal Reserve can
use in setting the growth of nonborrowed reserves so as to achieve
the targeted growth for that aggregate, (7) is a more reliable
guide than (6) to the accuracy to be expected on a quarter—to—
quarter basis. Although the standard error of each equation in

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.1%per annum) is still by far the smallest.
The Federal Reserve System has used the quantity of
nonborrowed reserves as its operating instrument since October
1979, but there is no assurance that it will always do
Hence it is useful to know whether the results found by estimating
(6) and (7) carry over to an alternative choice of instrument.
The final two panels of Table5present corresponding summary
statisticsfor estimating, again using quarterly data for 1959-80,
the analogous relationships
AFt =a+ ÷ 11Y1rD, + (8)
4 4 4 4
AF =a+ + ÷rFi +OJpFt (9)
inwhich the instrument variable is rF the federal funds rate,
Although the specific results vary somewhat in comparison to
those shown in the two panels above, the superior performance
of the equation for total net credit continues as before, with
standarderrors again equal to 1.4% and 1.1% per annum without
and with the lagged credit values, respectively.
The final two panels of Table 6 show the full sets of
coefficientsestimated for (8)using total net credit and Ml as
thefinancial aggregate. Here the t—statistics on the estimated
5valuesshow thatthe connection between credit and the federal
funds rate instrument is somewhat more significant than that for
Mljust the opposite of the case shown above for the reserves—23—
instrument. Even so, the t—statjstjcs on the respective coefficient
sumsaresmall (in absolute value) for both credit and24
The overall conclusion suggested by this evidence on the
quarterly relationships is that the connection betweentotalnet
credit ai-ideithera reserves or aninterestrate monetary policy
instrument is roughly comparable to the relationship for the
monetary aggregates.—24—
Iv.Using Monthly Data on Money and Credit
The analysis in Section III in effect proceeds as if the
Federal Reserve System, in seeking to control its money and/or
credit growth targets over a calendar quarter, would decide on
the growth of nonborrowed reserves (or the level of the federal
funds rate) at the beginning of that quarter and then take no
further action until the beginning of the next quarter. Such
a procedure would be sensible only if data describing the within-
quarter movements of money and credit were either not available
at all or were sufficiently "noisy" to be useless. In fact, data
on both money and credit are available on at least a monthly
basis (weekly for Ml). The noisiness of these short—run data,
as indicated by subsequent revisions, is well known (especially
for the weekly Ml series); but there is no reason to believe that
the incoming monthly data are so poor as to be of no use at all
inmaking within-quarter adjustments 25
Although the standard vehiclein which the Federal Reserve
System publishes data on the total net credit aggregate is the
flow—of—funds accounts, a publication which appears only once per
quarter, the great bulk of the underlying data is actually a
available monthly. Indeed, the Federal Reserve currently maintains,
on an unpublished basis, a monthly credit data file. As of
yearend 1980, the total net credit measure for the United States
was $3,907.5 billion, of which $3,436.1 billion, or 88%, consisted
of items regularly reported each month and included in the Federal
Reserve'smonthlydata file. Somewhat ironically, many of the items—25—
notincluded in this monthly data file represent the lending
activities of various components of the federal government itself.26
Ofthe $471.4 billion of 1980 yearend total net credit not included
in the monthly data file, $290.7 billion represented credit
advanced directly by the U.S. Government or by its sponsored credit
agencies and mortgage poois. If the Federal Reserve were merely
to collect from the relevant agencies of the federal government
the kind of data it already has on the private sector, therefore,
more than 95% of the total net credit aggregate would be available
monthly.
Evenwithout anyextra data reporting on the government's
part, however, the information contained in the 88% of total net
credit which is currently included each month is hardly without
value for monetary policy. For the 1963-77 sample period (the
longest interval for which seasonally adjusted credit series now
exist in the Federal Reserve's monthly data file 27), the correlation
between the total net credit series reported in the flow—of-funds
accountsand the quarterly"total" net credit series formed by
using only the end-of-quarter months of the corresponding monthly
series is .99985. Moreover, the relationship between nonfinancial
economic activity and this quarterly "total" net credit series is
fully comparable to that shown for the actual total net credit
series in Section I.
Table 7 presents summary statistics for monthly analogs to
the quarterly relationships (6) and (8) in the formTABLE 7
FINANCIALAGGREGATE CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS; MONTHLY DATA
SE DW
Reserves Instrument
Aggregate: Credit .00221 .14 1.80
Ml .00326 .12 2.02
M2 .00269 .34 .94
M3 .00295 .29 .84
InterestRate Instrument
Aggregate: Credit .00208 .24 2.01
Ml .00327 .11 1.99
M2 .00213 .59 1.24
M3 .00290 .31 .79—26—
6' 6 6
=ct+ + ' +'SAR_ (10)
=+ASt
+ + (SiFt_i (11)
estimated using monthly data for the 1963-77 sampic, where S is
the natural logarithm of total sales in manufacturing andtrade,
and the three sets of distributed lag coefficients are constrained
to lie along respective fourth—order polynomials with the implied
== (S7 = 029 The standard errors are comparable to or
smaller than those shown for the quarterly equations in Table 5,
but the coefficients ofdetermination are smaller (as is to be
expected).3° cce again, the equations for the credit aggregate
exhibitthe smallest standard error (2.7% per annumand 2.5%
perannumwith the reserves and interest rate instruments, respective—
ly), although M2 is a veryclose second with the interest rate
instrument.At least for credit and Ml, the Durbin—Watson statistics
donot show evidence of significant serial correlation. Table 8
shows the full sets ofcoefficients for the credit and Ml equations,
andhere it is apparent from the estimated (Svalues(and the
associated t-statistics) that the relationship of neither aggregate
toplausible policy instruments is well defined on a monthly basis.
31
Much further work clearly remains to be done in developing
monthlycredit relationships that would be of potential use for
conductingmonetary policy, including in the first instance the
inclusion of current seasonally adjusted credit data.32Nevertheless,























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































data(even without the missing U.S.Government reports)are
sufficientlycomparable to the monthly monetary aggregate data
topermit the Federal Reserve to take account of a target based
on either one more than just once per quarter.—28—
V. Summary of Conclusions
The principal criteria for the selection of an intermediate
target for monetary policy are (1) that the target be closely
related to the nonfinancial objectives of monetary policy, (2)
that it contain information about the future movements of those
relevant aspects of the nonfinancial economy, (3) that it be
closely connected to the instruments over which the central bank
can exert direct control, and (4) that data on it be readily
available on a timely basis.
The empirical evidence considered in this paper supports a
positive conclusion —atleast in comparison with the major
monetary aggregates —aboutthe potential use of total net credit
as an intermediate target variable on each of these four criteria.
First, the relationship between total net credit and aggregate
measures of nonfinancial economic activity, judged by several
different methodological approaches, is as stable and reliable as
the corresponding relationship for any of the monetary aggregates
(or the monetary base). Second, dynamic analysis based on exogeneity
tests and decomposition of variance shows that the information
about subsequent movements in nonfinancial activity contained in
total net credit is at least comparable to that contained in the
Ml money stock. Third, relationships between total net credit
and either the quantity of nonborrowed reserves or the federal
funds rate are roughly comparable to the corresponding relationships
for the principal monetary aggregates. Finally, data for a close
approximation to total net credit are available on a monthly basis,—29—
and the relevant relationships based on the monthly data are also
roughly comparable to the corresponding relationships for the
monetary aggregates.
These conclusions consistently support the use of total
net credit as an intermediate target for monetary policy, either
together with or instead of one of the monetary aggregates —
aslong as the Federal Reserve System continues to operate within
theintermediate target framework, It is important to note
explicitly, however, that the interpretation of empirical results
throughoutthis paper is entirely relative in context. The essential
question asked, in each case, is whether or not total net credit
meets a specific criterion at least as well as any or all of the
more familiar monetary aggregates, and in each case the answer is
yes. These results therefore bear importantly on what intermediate
targets the Federal Reserve should use, as long as it uses any
at all; but they leave open the more fundamental question of
whether the intermediate target framework itself is the best
way to conduct monetary policy in the current environment.Footnotes
*Iamgrateful to Richard Clarida for research assistance and
manyhelpful discussions; to Robert Rasche, Carl christ and
otherconference participants, as well as to Stephen Taylor,
for useful comments on anearlierdraft; andtothe National
ScienceFoundation (grant SES81—12673) and the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation for research support.
1.In the early post—war years, the Federal Reserve was obligated
topeg bondprices. After the 1951 Treasury-Federal Reserve
Accord, u.s. monetary policy followed a "free reserves"
strategy that was essentially equivalent to setting nominal
interest rates; see, for example, Davis (1971). During the
late 1960s monetary policy was focused on short—term nominal
interest rates directly.
2. It is difficult to be precise about when the Federal Reserve
began focusing on monetary targets in an important way.
Congressdid not ask the Federal Reserve to announce its
monetarytargets in advance until 1975, but the Federal
Open Market Committee started including a monetary growth
target in its monetary policy directives in 1970. For evidence
onthe importance of monetary aggregate targets in Federal
Reserve policymaking during these years, see De Rosa and Stern
(1977),Diggins (1978), Feige and McGee (1979), and Lombra
and Moran (1980).3. This section draws heavily on my earlier papers, especially
Friedman (1981, 1982a); see those papers for more complete
descriptions of the data andmorecomplete sets of empirical
results.
4. The three monetary aggregates all follow the Federal Reserve's
new (post-1980) definitions. The reason for including bank
credit is that the Federal Reserve currently includes a
bank credit target, along with the targets for the monetary
aggregates, in its semi—annual reports to Congress.
5. Thisis the specification originally made popular by the
FederalReserve Bank of St. Louis. Its use here is intended
to facilitate ready comparisons. Even so, the precise details
of the specification do not matter much. For example, the
standard errors for the estimation of (1) subject to no
constraints at all on theand y coefficients are .00738 for
total net credit, .00863 for bank credit, .00709 for Ml,
.00820 for M2, .00835 for M3, and .00825 for the monetary
base, changing the lag length apparently does not matter
much either.
6. The estimated values also look about as plausible for
total net credit as for the monetary aggregates. The estimated
values (and associated t—statistics) for total net credit are
.958 (4.0), .541 (4.0), —.097 (—0.4), —.349 (—2,7) and —.155
(—0.6), with sum .899 (5.0). The corresponding values for Ml,
for example, are .437 (3.8), .437 (5.9), .245 (2.6), .043
(0.6) and —.056 (—0.5), with sum 1.106 (6.3). The sum ofcoefficients is near unity in both cases, as expected, while
theindividual coefficients on total net credit decline more
rapidly than do those on Ml andevenshow one significant
negative value, thereby suggesting a more complicated response
pattern of income.
7. 2xnong the most important criticisms of the St. Louis approach
have been those of Goldfeld and Blinder (1972), Sargent (1976),
and Modigliani and 2ndo (1976). The methodology underlying
the tests described below is due largely to Granger and Sims;
see especially Sims (1980).








for 7, =cov(p1,p2)/var(.i1).This orthogonalization is
equivalent to placing F last in the pairwise causal ordering
ofy and F. Thealternative ordering placing F first, which
followsfrom transposing the X (or —A) and the zero elements,
gives results that are close to those reported below, indicating
that the arbitrarily selected ordering of the orthogonalization
doesnot matter much here. See Friedman (1981)for the full
set of results based on both orderings.9. Analogous simulations, showing the dynamic response of
each respective F/Y ratio to a 1% innovation in Y, showed
little difference from one definition of F to another; see
Friedman (1981).
10. The full set of results presented in Friedman (1981) showed
sharply unstable relationships for other credit aggregates,
including measures either narrower or broader than total net
credit. Similar instability for these other credit measures
appeared in simulations of the trivariate systems corresponding
to those shown in the bottom half of Table 2.
11, Analogous simulations, showing the dynamic response of each
respective F/(X'P) ratio to a 1% innovation in either x or
P, showed more limited differences from one definition of F
to another; see again Friedman (1981).
12. An exception,which is probably not of much practical importance,
is the case in which data on the aggregate are available before
data on income. The data—lag case has received a good deal
of attention in the literature, primarily because it is
isomorphicto the more relevant case of structural economic
lags; see Friedman (1975).
13. The exogeneity test results shown in Table 3 differ in several
interesting respects from those based on the pre—1980 Ml
definition and a 1953—78 sample period in Friedman (l982a),
which indicated more fully parallel roles for money and
credit. For example, the F—statistics corresponding to the
four-variablesystem shown in the bottom panel were (byrows, as in Table 3) 10.77*, 2.42**, 2.47**, 2.l4**; 0.28,
59•53*, 1.35, 0.55; 2.50**, 2.67**, 107.11*, 0.92; 1.01,
1.71, l.95***, 161.10*. Here, in contrast to the results
shownin Table 3,both money and credit are significant in
therealincome equation, while neither is (individually)
significant in the price equation.
14. To recall, the moving-average representation, analogous to
(2),expresses all movement in each variable in termsofthe
historyof innovations corresponding to itself and other
variables in the system.
15. see again footnote 8. The orthogonalization procedure for
thefour—variable system is analogous. The simple correlations
of the estimated innovations (before orthogonalization) are
.58, p =.33, =—.03, = = —.10and MC =-.21.
16. Seeagainfootnote 13.
17. Shiller (1980) has also questioned the central bank's ability
to influence real interest rates. Although most economists
have accepted the central bank's ability to control short-
term interest rates, at least over short time horizons and
in nonpathological circumstances, doubt about the ability to
control long—term interest rates is of long standing.
18. Even in the absence of anycontrollabilityat all, however,
a variable could serve as a monetary policy "information
variable" in the sense of Kareken et al. (1973) andFriedman
(1975)19. See, for example, the work of Johannes and Rasche (1979,
1981) and Tinsley et al. (1981).
20. Equations of this form have become standard since the work
of Davis and Shadrack (1974). As in the case of the St.
Louis equations presented in Section I, the use of the
Davis—Schadrack form here is intended to facilitate ready
comparisons. n additional variable included by Davis and
Shadrack, the quantity of government deposits, is omitted
here and in (7) -(11)below because preliminary experimenta-
tion indicated that its coefficent was never significantly
nonzero. Experimentation not reported here also indicated
that the nature of the constraint imposed on the respective
distributed lags had no noticeable implications for the results.
21. Interpretation of these relationships is subject to the usual
caveatsregarding whether they are true reduced forms; even
ifso,whether the underlying behavior would remain invariant
tosystematic changes in the conduct of policy; and whether
the use of within—quarter corrections, based on incoming
data, would significantly matter. Although a structural
approach like that implemented in Friedman (1977) or Sivesind
and Hurley (1980) would be preferable, in that it would at
least address the first of these potential problems, such
an effort lies beyond the scope of this paper. The results
presented in Section IV below bear on the issue of within-
quarter corrections.22. Onecontrastbetween the estimated 5valuesshown for credit
andthoseshown for Ml in the top two panels of Table 6 is
thatthe implied polynomial for credit has an unstable root
while that for Ml does not. Single—minded use of the reserves
instrumentto control a credit target, without anyallowance
for the uncertainty associated with the estimated coefficient
values, would therefore lead to "instrument instability"
in the sense outlined by Holbrook (1972). The relevance of
this result is dubious, however, since credit would probably
notbe the sole intermediate target, and since the optimal
policywould allow for uncertainty in the manner shown by
Brainard (1967) in any case.
23. Indeed, as of the time of writing there is some debate over
whether it is still doing so.
24. The 5valuesshown in the bottom two panels of Table 6 indicate
unstable polynomials with a federal fundsrateinstrument
forboth credit and Ml.See again footnote 22.
25. A potentially useful exercise, which lies beyond the scope
of this paper, would be to compare the relative extent to
which the monthly credit data and monetary aggregate data,
respectively,are subject to revision.
26. In practice the bulk of the credit data is gathered from
reporting by lenders. In principle, of course, the relevant
information could be gathered from either lenders or borrowers.27. After1977 the Federal Pserve ceased performing seasonal
adjustments to its monthly credit data file. The Federal
Reserve staff is currently developing a seasonally adjusted
monthly credit data file that will be up to date. Once these
new data are available, it will be straightforward to carry
out the empirical work presented below on a current sample.
28. For example, the coefficient of variation of the ratio of
quarterly"total" net credit to gross national product over
1963—77 is .016 on the basis of the raw data and .010 on
the basis of the detrended data, The summary statistics
forthe nominal income equation (1), estimated for the
1963—77 sample period, are SE =.00762,2 =23and
DW =2.25.These results are comparable to the results for
total net credit (and superior to those for the monetary
aggregates) for the experiments in Table 1 redone for the
1963—77 sample.
29. Use of the business sales variable, in the absence of monthly
data on the gross national product, again follows Davis and
Schadrack (1974).
30. Because they tend to be more volatile than credit (or Ml)
on a monthly basis, M2 and M3 show larger
2
values despite
the larger standard errors.
31. As in the results based on quarterly data, the estimated
values indicate an unstable polynomial for credit (though not
Ml) with a reserves instrument, and for both credit and Ml
with a federal funds rate instrument.32. See again foothote 27.References
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